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The main purpose of this work is to deal with the question of temporality as 
constitutive for the subject itself. In order to pursue this goal we will take into 
consideration Kant’s transcendental philosophy as that perspective which puts 
together temporality and subjectivity in an original way without precedent. It is not 
only that in the Copernican turn time becomes a subjective a priori condition of 
sensible experience and every phenomenon in general, but rather, times turns out to 
be the most profound figure of synthesis and mediation. Connection under the 
condition of time (Ricoeur) is one of the main traits of the Kantian Self, so we could 
say that time permits the transcendental and ontological position of third term (das 
Dritte), intermediary and necessary to join together, link and identify.  
 
The first step begins with the thesis on radical heterogeneity in Kant’s epistemology. 
Two main branches of human knowledge, sensibility and understanding, are separated 
in such manner that there are completely autonomous and heterogeneous. There is no 
way to derive understanding from sensibility and vice versa. This duality (which 
should not be taken as dualism) opens from the very beginning the question of 
synthesis and unity: What does keep the subject together? What constitutes the 
subjectivity as such in its unity? How is synthesis possible? The problem of an 
original unity, a common ground of two basic sources of knowledge, has been 
brought up by Heidegger in his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics1. For Kant, 
himself, the unique root of sensibility and understanding, if exists, is unknown to us2
 
. 
This unknown, in all its noumenal significance, should be the key point in our 
elaboration, as exactly that theoretical point where the time intervenes in its complex 
relation with an another of Kant’s concepts – imagination. 
The most basic definition of imagination would be that the faculty of imagination is 
the one, which represents (vorstellen) in intuition an object that is not itself present. 
This re-activation of the intuitive receptivity by re-presenting something not present 
has empirical meaning and as such belongs to the empirio-psychological domain of 
association on the basis of memory. However, there is another type of imagination 
which Kant calls productive, and its role is to spontaneously produce the 
representation of an object without its previous empirical presence in intuition. In 
such manner imagination is an effect of the understanding upon sensibility. Moreover, 
in the first edition of Critique of Pure Reason Kant says that imagination is the 
fundamental faculty of the human soul, and he adds that synthesis in general is a 
simple effect of the imagination as a blind but indispensable faculty of which we are 
rarely conscious3
 
. It seems here that the act of synthesis as such has the peculiar 
character of imagination; in other words, synthesis is in some way always 
“imaginative” as an effect of a more profound and unconscious faculty. Already here 
we can notice the ambiguity in Kant’s dealing with imagination, since there is a 
noteworthy difference between the claim that synthesis is an effect of imagination as 
something more profound and another claim that imagination is an effect of 
understanding (spontaneous synthesis) on the sensibility. Many Kantian scholars 
emphasize this shift from the first to second edition of the Critique, where 
imagination seems to lose its autonomy provided by the first edition. However, what 
Kant, in any case, does not disavow is that the synthesis has been carried out already 
on pre-conceptual level, that is, sensibility offers a representation that is always the 
unified manifold, thus, synthesized.  
In the first edition of his first Critique Kant also proposes the famous triple synthesis: 
synthesis of apprehension in intuition, synthesis of reproduction in imagination, 
synthesis of recognition in concepts. If we analyze it we will see that this triple 
synthesis is temporally determined and articulated. In the intuition we have to deal 
with a flux of manifold sensations. Every intuition contains a manifold, but it is 
always manifold that is unified. And this unification has a temporal form of “now and 
here in this moment”. The work of apprehension resides exactly in such instantaneous 
and immediate synthesis. We could not have any representation and any cognition 
without this originary synthesis at the level of intuitions by means of which every 
instant, every “now” is occupied by one perception, one sensuous unity.  However, 
apprehension is not sufficient to generate a necessary connection between 
representations. What comes forward in the second step – synthesis of reproduction in 
imagination – is not the singular unity of something being-present now, but the unity 
of sameness in the succession between past and present. In the temporal series of 
various sensations there are some representations that are the same as previous ones, 
and which are maintained in consciousness. This repetition or retention during the 
course of time is based upon an originary transcendental reproducibility that makes 
such reproduction of representations possible. The transcendental operation that has 
this role is nothing but imagination. So when Kant speaks about synthesis of 
reproduction in imagination he thinks of the operation of making-present something 
that has been present earlier. Explained in these terms, imagination seems only 
empirical, since it is based on the simple act of recalling to memory. But if we put the 
whole analysis in transcendental terms then we have to ask ourselves about the 
condition of the possibility of this kind of synthesis in which a certain content does 
not vanish during the course of time. The first condition is the possibility to 
differentiate time, to distinguish between “at this time” and “at that time”. Kant says 
that mind “differentiates time”, but it is actually imagination itself that introduces 
these temporal distinctions. And this imagination is pure reproduction since it doesn’t 
reproduce any content, but produces the very conditions of every empirical 
reproduction (some kind of productive reproduction). Therefore, the imagination 
creates a horizon of “again” in which now and not-longer-now are differentiated as 
the conditions of possibility that something repeats itself, so that such transcendental 
temporal differentiation permits the identity of contents (reproduction). Third step in 
Kant’s triple synthesis is dedicated to the conceptualization by means of recognition. 
Heidegger concludes that this third synthesis must “form” the future4, so that three 
modes of synthesis correspond to the three dimensions of time (apprehension – 
present, reproduction – past, recognition – future). Paul Ricoeur, on the other hand, 
speaks about a delusion5
 
, since our conceptuality, or, faculty of understanding doesn’t 
add anything new to the previous synthesis of imagination: what makes possible the 
conceptual unity of representation is the very unity of consciousness, so that in the 
conceptual synthesis consciousness recognizes itself as subject of its own operation. If 
there is no new operation on conceptual level but just recognition, we could come to 
the conclusion that conceptualization is only a self-conscious imagination that reflects 
itself, recognizes and knows itself as a fundamental operation of synthesis. So, in 
some kind of Hegelian dialectic gesture we can interpret these three synthesis as 
gradual movement of the imagination toward its self-consciousness: from immediate 
apprehension, through the moment of temporal difference introduced by reproduction, 
imagination reaches the conceptuality where it recognizes its own “truth”, i.e., the 
conceptual unity as the uppermost level of transcendental synthesis. 
Another important segment of Kantian thought where time has been brought out in 
the foreground is the doctrine on schematism, which is essential to understand the 
strict connection between synthesis, temporality and imagination. The schema has a 
role of the third (das Dritte), which mediates between sensibility and understanding. It 
is our faculty of judgment that makes use of the schema in the application of the 
concepts to the empirical intuitions. However, the schemata are the product of 
transcendental imagination, that is to say, they are representations that are at the same 
time sensible and intellectual, and that is the ground for their mediating function. The 
same twofold meaning is valid for time: time as universal determination is 
homogeneous with categories, but it is also homogeneous with the intuition, for it is 
also the form of the inner sense and as such the form of every phenomenon in general 
which belongs to the subject as its Vorstellung. Due to this nature of schemata, 
defined by Kant as Zeitbestimmung (time-determination), the temporal meaning of 
schematism follows the division of categories of understanding: quantity – series of 
time; quality – time that is filled up with contents, determined as absence or presence; 
relation – time-order structured as succession, permanence, simultaneity; modality – 
totality of time and a way (possible, necessary or real) in which an object belongs to 
the time as such. What is interesting to notice is that this exposition of schemata 
follows some kind of “genesis” of time: that is, at the beginning we have only time as 
pure series and progression in terms of quantity and numerical addition, then time 
becomes filled up with some qualitative contents. After that the contents enter in 
mutual relation structuring the order of time, and at the end we have the whole of time 
and its pure relation with objects in terms of their possibility, necessity or reality.  
This “genesis” is a Bestimmung-process, i.e. a process of gradual determination of 
time where each temporal figure or each grade serves as a correspondent schema. 
 
The Kantian Self has two constituents which sometimes seem like two sides of the 
same transcendental center – one is apperception, the other one is time. Both are the 
constitutive fundaments of subjectivity providing its identity, its universal and 
objective validity. The apperception is a necessary assembly point, Radikalvermögen 
as Kant calls it, to which every our representation needs to be in a necessary relation. 
In other words, we all remain the one and the same self-conscious identity in every 
manifold representation that we possess, and this unity of the subject that Kant defines 
as the transcendental unity of apperception, is the guarantee for the unity of the 
objects as phenomenon. This could also be expressed as: the unity of self-
consciousness is the basis for the unity of consciousness itself. “For in this constant 
and enduring I (of pure apperception) consists the correlate of all our presentations 
insofar as becoming conscious of them is so much as possible” (C.P.R., A124)6
 
.  
This central point of subjectivity and its formal universality is also reached through 
the form of its inner sense, or pure inner intuition – time. “All presentations, whether 
or not they have outer things as their objects […] belong to our inner state; and this 
inner state is subject to the formal condition of inner intuition, and hence to the 
condition of time”. And also: “All objects of the senses, are in time and stand 
necessarily in relations of time.” (C.P.R., B51). As the form of inner sense, time is the 
universal formal condition of all phenomena as objects of our senses constituted as 
representations that belong to our consciousness. The reality of time is not empirical 
reality, in the sense that time could be a property of some phenomenal representable 
object. As Kant says, we cannot perceive time (C.P.R., B219, B225) and we don’t 
have the experience of time as such. In some sense, time is invisible (does this not 
remind us of the “blind function” of imagination?). Moreover, the fact that we are not 
capable of representing time without drawing the straight line in space is a good proof 
that there is no proper visualization for temporality so we must use the space as 
external form. Time is pure irrepresentable interiority. However, even though 
deprived of its own empirical representation, time as pure intuition defines a mode in 
which we represent the empirical objects (whereby time is determinant, constitutive). 
“Time does not belong to any shape or position, etc., but rather determines the 
relation of presentations in our inner state” (C.P.R., B50). Hence, time is something 
that is without its proper place, not-positioned, purely relational; and therefore 
without possibility to be experienced immediately. Nonetheless time remains the 
ground of all possible experience.  
 Kant would also say that time does not change although it is a condition of every 
change and movement. Only that which is within time stays under the necessity of 
change and alteration, but time itself remains the same immutable form (cf., C.P.R., 
B58, B225). Here we can recognize a very significant analogy with Kant’s claim 
about the I that remains constant and stable in spite of the stream of various 
representations and manifold of phenomena assigned to the I. It is important to avoid 
the conclusion that this permanence and stability is something metaphysical, in the 
terms of substantialization of subjectivity. Time and apperception are permanent in a 
transcendental sense, as enduring forms, functions, conditions of the experience, and 
not as some eternal entity or “thing”.  
 
Another approach to the temporal character of the Kantian subjectivity can be 
exhibited passing through Deleuze’s very inspiring lectures on Kant7. Deleuze draws 
out the poetic expression from Hamlet: “Time is out of joint”, which he interprets in 
terms of subordinate and independent time. Kant’s Copernican reversal consists 
exactly in this passage from time, which is subordinated to the ontological movement 
of nature, to time as pure, linear and empty form “liberated” from cyclic curvatures 
and natural dynamics of the world. Time is no longer measure of such dynamics, but 
its formal condition; it means, in other words, that movement is now subordinated to 
time. As we have already seen, referring to the passage from the first Critique, time is 
pure representation, which operates as the immutable condition for every change and 
mutation8. This reversal implies the independence of time and its sovereignty, which 
we ought to interpret as something that opens, exposes the Self to the world, allowing 
the world to be seen, to be perceived and experienced. This independence of time is 
paradigmatic, since it also implies the independence and self-reliance of the 
subjectivity itself. Therefore: subjectivity is out of joint. 
 
Finally, we are induced to draw a conclusion: time is some kind of blind spot, non-
place, without shape, empty field of pure relation with the objectivity (and also, as 
inner sense, with reflexive subjectivity). Someone could object that even the form of 
space has a similar role of the exposing the subject to be affected by external objects 
and receive representations. So why time, and not space, has to be the core of 
subjectivity? Because time as the form of interiority, and not only as an inner form of 
sensibility (which also space is), is the constitutive frame for every representation, 
including those representations, which regard ourselves and our inner states, our self-
representations. There is one very important passage in which Kant says that we place 
in time the representations of the outer sense and that time underlies the way in which 
we place them in mind: 
 
 
“But the time in which we place these presentations, and which itself precedes 
the consciousness of them in experience and underlies, as formal condition, 
the way in which we place them within the mind, already contains relations: of 
succession, of simultaneity, and of what is simultaneous with succession (the 
permanent).” (C.P.R B67) 
 
 
What comes to light here is the process of the constitution of representation as such 
and its relational character; not this or that representation, but representative (viz. 
relational) character of all our cognitive activity. Here the object-side of 
representation (objects out of us) serves as the affecting instance, which arouses the 
self-reflection, self-relation, that is, the reverting to the inner conditions of our 
possible experience. And this return inward is possible only on the basis of our 
temporality; in other words, time reveals the relation of the subject with itself. This is 
the reason why Kant also claims that the form of intuition is nothing but the mode in 
which mind (Gemüt) is affected by its own activity. Form of this self-affection is time 
and due to its self-reflective structure time ontologically precedes the form of space.  
 
Turning back to the theme of radical heterogeneity from the beginning of this work, 
we must add that this heterogeneity does not rely only upon two natures which 
operate in the subjectivity: one receptive, passive and other one spontaneous, active, 
productive. The line, which tears the subject, passes through its own self-reflection. 
Kant distinguishes the “I” that thinks itself (apperception, self-consciousness) and the  
“I” that intuits itself (self-affection), but these two are the one and the same subject. 
Deleuze rightly notes that this problem of the connection or coexistence of two forms 
of the same subject (self-affection of time and self-consciousness of I think) overtakes 
the place of the old metaphysical problem of the unity of soul and body, or unity 
between two substances in Descartes. Now, the main problem of Kant is not to unify 
soul and body, but sensibility and understanding, affection and production, time and 
apperception – that is two aspects of the same subject. And analogously to Descartes 
(but also radically different), who introduces God as the supreme instance that allows 
the epistemological and ontological passage from “res cogitans” to “res extensa”, 
Kant sets forth – on different levels – time, apperception and imagination as that third, 
mediating factor that connects the subject with the object in such a manner that the 
object becomes an appearance for the subject. With Kant the point of identity between 
subject and object is grounded in the subject’s temporally articulated synthetic 
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